Cornelius Scipio
Methuselah, Africanus the Elder Publius Cornelius Scipio (a.k.a. Horatius Cocles,)
Overview
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus ( 236–183 BC), also known as Scipio Africanus Major, Scipio Africanus the Elder, and Scipio the Great, was a Roman general and later consul who is often regarded as one of the greatest military commanders and strategists of all time. His main achievements were during the Second Punic War. He is best known for defeating Hannibal at the final Battle of Zama (near modern Zama, Tunisia) in 202 BC. The victory was one of the feats that earned him the agnomen Africanus.
Scipio's conquest of Carthaginian Iberia culminated in the Battle of Ilipa (near Alcalá del Río, Spain) in 206 BC against Hannibal's brother Mago Barca. Although considered a hero by the Roman people, primarily for his victories against Carthage, Africanus had many opponents, especially Cato the Censor, who deeply hated him. In 187 BC, he was even tried alongside his brother for bribes they supposedly received from King Antiochos III during the Roman–Seleucid War. Disillusioned by the ingratitude of his peers, Scipio left Rome and retired from public life at his villa in Liternum.
Scipio joined the Roman struggle against Carthage in the first year of the Second Punic War when his father was consul. During the Battle of Ticinus, he saved his father's life by "charging the encircling force alone with reckless daring."
He survived the disaster at the Battle of Cannae, where his would-be father-in-law, the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, was killed. After the battle, with the other consul surviving elsewhere, Scipio and Appius Claudius Pulcher, as military tribunes, took charge of some 10,000 survivors. On hearing that Lucius Caecilius Metellus and other young nobles were planning to go overseas to serve some king, Scipio stormed into the meeting, and at sword-point, forced all present to swear that they would not abandon Rome.
Scipio offered himself as a candidate for aedilis curulis in 213 BC alongside his cousin Marcus Cornelius Cethegus. The Tribunate of the Plebs objected to his candidacy, saying that he could not be allowed to stand because he had not yet reached the legal age. Scipio, already known for his bravery and patriotism, was elected unanimously and the Tribunes abandoned their opposition. His cousin also won the election.
Campaign in Hispania
In 211 BC, both Scipio's father, Publius Scipio, and uncle, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, were killed at the Battle of the Upper Baetis in Spain against Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal Barca. In spite of his youth (25 years old), his noble demeanour and enthusiastic language had made so great an impression that he was unanimously elected. In the year of Scipio's arrival all of Hispania south of the Ebro river was under Carthaginian control. Hannibal's brothers Hasdrubal and Mago, and Hasdrubal Gisco were the generals of the Carthaginian forces in Hispania, and Rome was aided by the inability of these three figures to act in concert. The Carthaginians were also preoccupied with revolts in Africa.Scipio landed at the mouth of the Ebro and was able to surprise and capture Carthago Nova (New Carthage), the headquarters of the Carthaginian power in Hispania. He obtained a rich cache of war stores and supplies and an excellent harbour and base of operations. Scipio's humanitarian conduct toward prisoners and hostages in Hispania helped in portraying the Romans as liberators as opposed to conquerors. Livy tells the story of his troops capturing a beautiful woman, whom they offered to Scipio as a prize of war. Scipio was astonished by her beauty but discovered that the woman was betrothed to a Celtiberian chieftain named Allucius. He returned the woman to her fiancé, along with the money that had been offered by her parents to ransom her. This humanitarian act encouraged local chieftains to both supply and reinforce Scipio's small army. The woman's fiancé, who soon married her, responded by bringing over his tribe to support the Roman armies.
In 209 BC, Scipio fought his first set piece battle, driving back Hasdrubal Barca from his position at Baecula on the upper Guadalquivir. Scipio feared that the armies of Mago and Gisco would enter the field and surround his small army. Scipio's objective was, therefore, to quickly eliminate one of the armies to give him the luxury of dealing with the other two piecemeal. The battle was decided by a determined Roman infantry charge up the centre of the Carthaginian position. Roman losses are uncertain but may have been considerable in light of an effort by the infantry to scale an elevation defended by Carthaginian light infantry. Scipio then orchestrated a frontal attack by the rest of his infantry to draw out the remainder of the Carthaginian forces. Hasdrubal had not noticed Scipio's hidden reserves of cavalry moving behind enemy lines, and a Roman cavalry charge created a double envelopment on either flank led by cavalry commander Gaius Laelius and Scipio himself. This broke the back of Hasdrubal's army and routed his forces—an impressive feat for the young Roman versus the veteran Carthaginian general. Despite a Roman victory, Scipio was unable to hinder the Carthaginian march to Italy. Much historical criticism has been levelled at his inability to effectively pursue Hasdrubal, who would eventually cross the Alps only to be defeated by Gaius Claudius Nero at the Battle of the Metaurus.
One popular theory for Scipio's failure to pursue Hasdrubal is that Scipio merely wanted the glory of securing Hispania, and an extended mountain campaign would have endangered that. Others cite the Roman soldiers' appetite for plunder as preventing him from rallying in pursuit. The most probable explanation from a strategic standpoint is Scipio's unwillingness to risk being trapped between Hasdrubal's army on one side and one or both of Gisgo's and Mago's armies, both of superior numerical strength. Mere days after Hasdrubal's defeat, Mago and Gisgo were able to converge in front of the Roman positions, bringing into question what would have happened had Scipio pursued Hasdrubal.
After winning over a number of Hispanian chiefs (namely Indibilis and Mandonius), Scipio achieved a decisive victory in 206 BC over the full Carthaginian levy at Ilipa, which resulted in the evacuation of Hispania by the Punic commanders.
African campaign
n 205 BC, Scipio was unanimously elected to consulship at the age of 31. Scipio intended to go to Africa, but due to the envy of others in the Senate, he was not given any additional troops beyond the Sicilian garrison. Despite this resistance, Scipio gathered resources from clients and supporters in Rome and among the Italian communities; this allowed him to muster a volunteer force of 30 warships and 7000 men.The forces stationed in Sicily at this time included a variety of forces. The Romans had for a long time used service in Sicily as a punishment, with the result that the garrison in Sicily contained survivors from many of the greatest Roman military fiascos in the war, such as the Battle of Cannae. Having served with these men at Cannae, Scipio was well aware that their disgrace was through no fault of their own. In addition, the Sicilian garrison also contained many of the troops who had participated in the Sicilian campaigns of Marcus Claudius Marcellus. From these men, Scipio was able to muster a highly motivated and very experienced force for his African invasion. Scipio turned Sicily into a camp for training his army.
Scipio realized that the Carthaginian forces—especially the superior Numidian cavalry—would prove decisive against the largely infantry forces of the Roman legions. In addition, a large portion of Rome's cavalry were allies of questionable loyalty, or noble equites exempting themselves from being lowly foot soldiers. One anecdote tells of how Scipio pressed into service several hundred Sicilian nobles to create a cavalry force. The Sicilians were quite opposed to this servitude to a foreign occupier (Sicily being under Roman control only since the First Punic War), and protested vigorously. Scipio assented to their exemption from service providing they pay for a horse, equipment, and a replacement rider for the Roman army. In this way, Scipio created a trained nucleus of cavalry for his African campaign.
The Roman Senate sent a commission of inquiry to Sicily and found Scipio at the head of a well-equipped and trained fleet and army. Scipio pressed the Senate for permission to cross into Africa. Some of the Roman Senate, championed by Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator "the Delayer", opposed the mission. Fabius still feared Hannibal's power, and viewed any mission to Africa as dangerous and wasteful to the war effort. Scipio was also harmed by some senators' disdain of his ideals, beliefs, and interests in unconventional areas such as Hellenophile tastes in art, luxuries, and philosophies. All Scipio could obtain was permission to cross over from Sicily to Africa if it appeared to be in the interests of Rome, but not financial or military support.
With the permission from the commissioners, Scipio sailed in 204 BC and landed near Utica. Carthage, meanwhile, had secured the friendship of the Numidian Syphax, whose advance compelled Scipio to abandon the siege of Utica and dig in on the shore between there and Carthage. In 203 BC, he destroyed the combined armies of the Carthaginians and Numidians by approaching by stealth and setting fire to their camp, where the combined army became panicked and fled, when they were mostly killed by Scipio's army. Though not a "battle," both Polybius and Livy estimate that the death toll in this single attack exceeded 40,000 Carthaginian and Numidian dead, and more captured.
Historians are roughly equal in their praise and condemnation for this act.
"of all the brilliant exploits performed by Scipio this seems to me the most brilliant and more adventurous."
Scipio quickly dispatched his two lieutenants, Laelius and Masinissa, to pursue Syphax. They ultimately dethroned Syphax, and ensured Prince Masinissa's coronation as King of the Numidians. Carthage, and especially Hannibal himself, had long relied upon these superb natural horsemen, who would now fight for Rome against Carthage.
Now deserted by its allies and surrounded by a veteran and undefeated Roman army, Carthage began opening diplomatic channels for negotiation. At the same time, Hannibal Barca and his army were recalled to Carthage, and despite the moderate terms offered to Carthage by Scipio, Carthage suddenly suspended negotiations and again prepared for war. The army that Hannibal returned with is a subject of much debate. Advocates for Hannibal often claim that his army was mostly Italians pressed into service from southern Italy and that most of his elite veterans and certainly cavalry were spent. Scipio's advocates tend to be far more suspicious and believe the number of veteran forces to remain significant.
Hannibal did have a trained pool of soldiers who had fought in Italy, as well as eighty war elephants. Hannibal could boast a strength of around forty thousand: 36,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, compared to Scipio's 29,000 infantry and 6,100 cavalry. The two generals met on a plain between Carthage and Utica on October 19, 202 BC, at the final Battle of Zama. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due largely to Roman distrust of the Carthaginians as a result of the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum, the breach of protocols which ended the First Punic War (known as Punic Faith), and a perceived breach in contemporary military etiquette due to Hannibal's numerous ambushes.
Hannibal arranged his infantry in three phalangial lines designed to overlap the Roman lines. His strategy, so oft reliant upon subtle stratagems, was simple: a massive forward attack by the war elephants would create gaps in the Roman lines, which would be exploited by the infantry, supported by the cavalry.
Rather than arranging his forces in the traditional manipular lines, which put the hastati, principes, and triarii in succeeding lines parallel to the enemy's line, Scipio instead put the maniples in lines perpendicular to the enemy, a stratagem designed to counter the war elephants. When the Carthaginian elephants charged, they found well laid traps before the Roman position and were greeted by Roman trumpeters, which drove many back out of confusion and fear. In addition, many elephants were goaded harmlessly through the loose ranks by the velites and other skirmishers. Roman javelins were used to good effect, and the sharp traps caused further disorder among the elephants. Many of them were so distraught that they charged back into their own lines. The Roman infantry was greatly rattled by the elephants, but Massinissa's Numidian and Laelius' Roman cavalry began to drive the opposing cavalry off the field. Both cavalry commanders pursued their routing Carthaginian counterparts, leaving the Carthaginian and Roman infantries to engage one another. The resulting infantry clash was fierce and bloody, with neither side achieving local superiority. The Roman infantry had driven off the two front lines of the Carthaginian army, and in the respite took an opportunity to drink water. The Roman army was then drawn up in one long line (as opposed to the traditional three lines) in order to match the length of Hannibal's line. Scipio's army then marched towards Hannibal's veterans, who had not yet taken part in the battle. The final struggle was bitter and won only when the allied cavalry rallied and returned to the battle field. Charging the rear of Hannibal's army, they caused what many historians have called the "Roman Cannae".
Many Roman aristocrats, especially Cato, expected Scipio to raze that city to the ground after his victory. However, Scipio dictated extremely moderate terms in contrast to an immoderate Roman Senate. While the security of Rome was guaranteed by demands such as the surrender of the fleet, and a lasting tribute was to be paid, the strictures were sufficiently light for Carthage to regain its full prosperity. With Scipio's consent, Hannibal was allowed to become the civic leader of Carthage, which the Cato family did not forget.
Return to Rome
Scipio was welcomed back to Rome in triumph with the agnomen of Africanus. He refused the many further honours which the people would have thrust upon him such as Consul for life and Dictator. In the year 199 BC, Scipio was elected Censor and for some years afterwards he lived quietly and took no part in politics.Retirement
Scipio's political enemies, led by Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, gained ground. When the Scipiones returned to Rome, two tribunes prosecuted (187 BC) Lucius on the grounds of misappropriation of money received from Antiochus. As Lucius was in the act of producing his account-books, his brother wrested them from his hands, tore them in pieces, and flung them on the floor of the Senate house. Scipio then allegedly asked the courts why they were concerned about how 3,000 talents had been spent and apparently unconcerned about how 15,000 talents were entering the state coffers (the tribute that Antiochus was paying Rome after his defeat by Lucius). This high-handed act shamed the prosecution, and it appears that the case against Lucius was dismissed.Scipio himself was subsequently (185 BC) accused of having been bribed by Antiochus. By reminding the people that it was the anniversary of his victory at Zama, he caused an outburst of enthusiasm in his favour. The people crowded round him and followed him to the Capitol, where they offered thanks to the gods and begged them to give Rome more citizens like Scipio Africanus. Despite the popular support that Scipio commanded, there were renewed attempts to bring him to trial, but these appear to have been deflected by his future son-in-law, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the Elder.
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